A proxy war is a civil conflict involving local factions supported by outside powers. Despite their lack of direct involvement in fighting, these powerful states can wield considerable influence in the conflict, influencing its outcome and exacerbating violence. The Syrian conflict, for example, saw global powers such as Russia, the United States, Iran, and Turkey back competing factions, further fuelling conflict in a country that already had significant instability.
These kinds of conflicts often find their way into the foreign policy toolkits of great powers when they face an opportunity to advance their interests without directly involving themselves. They can also be a viable option when there is an interest in altering the status quo but the risk of direct conflict is high or the state has limited capacity to engage in foreign affairs.
In practice, however, proxy warfare often fails. It can become very costly, engulf entire regions in violence, and leave the intervening state with difficult responsibilities at home and abroad. And the proxies often become corrupt, brutal, or incompetent, making it hard for their sponsors to sustain their support.
Nevertheless, this kind of indirect intervention will remain part of any state’s toolkit, especially as long as it can find willing partners and avoid unintended consequences. To succeed, the state must have a clear vision of what it wants to achieve through the conflict, make sure its partner is aligned with those goals, and manage emerging conditions-both self-inflicted and beyond its control-that hinder policy coherence.
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