A proxy war is a form of indirect intervention in intrastate conflict. This type of policy adds risk and uncertainty to a conflict, particularly for the intervening state. It requires that the intervening state carefully balance its pursuit of vital interests and its desire to prevent instability from spreading. This balancing act is further complicated by the fact that a proxy’s objectives may differ from those of the intervening state, and the presence of multiple actors in an intrastate conflict can complicate control. A policy of proxy warfare can be categorized as in it to win it, holding action, meddling, or feeding the chaos.
A major advantage of the proxy strategy is that it avoids direct warfare, limiting loss of life and civilian risks. The United States, for example, fought its own war for independence from Britain with the help of French forces at the battle of Yorktown (1781). It continues to fight a proxy war in Syria with its support of a broad coalition of partners, including Russia and Iran.
But proxy war is a dangerous game. The success of a proxy war depends on three conditions: compatibility of objectives, capability of the proxy, and the degree to which the proxy depends on outside support. Understanding these variables allows decision makers to better assess the utility of a proxy war policy and limit the damage caused by such conflicts. It is important to remember that even the most well-meaning interventions in an intrastate war can lead to long-term costs.
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