Economic sanctions have long been a major policy tool of major powers in their efforts to quell civil wars, national strife, and regional crises. The recent imposition of broad-brush sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine marks the latest milestone in this trend. The primary goal of these sanctions is to send a political signal—to allies, other third parties, or domestic audiences. However, the signal is not always clearly received and may be drowned out by a cacophony of protests from injured domestic parties (see Baldwin 1985, Cortright and Lopez 2002).
Past research on the political effectiveness of sanctions has highlighted two important factors: the size of the demands and the degree of political openness of the target country. Moreover, sanctions can become counterproductive and even hurt the sanctioner’s own economy due to trade substitution with third countries. In light of these limitations, it is crucial to understand how to fine-tune the use of these coercive instruments, while recognizing their limits.
To do so requires a thorough understanding of the targeted nation’s economic structure, trade relationships, and social fabric. It also requires balancing the need to apply pressure without plunging the target into a humanitarian crisis. To strike this delicate balance, researchers have sought to better understand the linkages between sanctions, political goals, and their economic effects and outcomes. In this issue, we focus on the theoretical and empirical literature examining the links between these variables. Our goal in collecting this work is to make it broadly accessible and encourage cross-disciplinary dialogue.
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