Regime change involves the forcible overthrow of a government or system of government by foreign actors. Often, the rationale is that the existing regime is corrupt or otherwise doing harm and that, if the people could choose their own leaders, they would elect more legitimate and benign governments with their best interests in mind. This argument was used, for example, to justify US intervention in Iran and Iraq or the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and al-Assad in Syria.
Yet academic research, and the historical record, reveals that armed regime-change missions rarely succeed, regardless of the strategy employed. Rather, they create chaos, unleash sectarian, ethnic, and geopolitical rivalries that undermine internal security and the ability of a new government to govern effectively.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that a regime-change policy enhances American security or promotes human rights. In fact, it is far more likely to destabilize the targeted country and empower factions that are as anti-U.S. and repressive as the old regime, or worse.
The record of regime-change efforts since 1953 — ironically, including George Kennan’s first attempt in Iran — shows no clear examples of success, many catastrophic failures, and universally high costs and unintended consequences. The United States should resist the temptation to remove hostile regimes and pursue a different approach, one that combines long-term engagement with diplomacy, development, defense, alliances, assistance, and regional organization to constrain adversaries and support emerging democracies. This is a far more effective strategy than regime change alone.
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